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Abstract 
 
Malaysia has been introducing Islamization policies since the 1980s and has used 
Friday khutbas (sermons) to convey government and religious authorities’ ideas and 
interpretations of Islam. We used content analysis of the texts of khutbas delivered in 
2013 and 2014 in six states in Malaysia, all of which were obtained from the respective 
states’ Islamic authorities’ websites. This research found that weekly Friday khutbas 
have been used to announce the Islamic authorities’ commitment to safeguard the 
sanctity of Sunni Islam, to monopolize the interpretation of Islam, to establish the 
collective mistreatment of minority Muslim groups, and to promote the implementation 
of hudud law. Our analysis demonstrates that the control exercised and exerted by the 
government and religious authorities over mosques, covering aspects ranging from the 
mosque’s administration and appointment of the imam to the preparation of the khutba 
text has created an ideal opportunity for the government to influence the Muslim 
society’s understanding and stance on a variety of social, religious and political issues 
in a multi-ethnic community. Despite the diversity of responses to khutbas, Muslims in 
Malaysia do not possess a forum in which to debate or criticize the contents of khutbas 
that are politicized, contain errors or inaccurate facts, are non-inclusive, and provide 
narrow and limited religious interpretations. Beyond Malaysia, this article may be used 
as a reference point or source of information for other Muslim communities to prevent 
governments and religious authorities from controlling khutba sermons, which may 
lead to the risk that they might be manipulated to benefit certain interested parties.  
 
Keywords: Islamization; Malaysia; Islamic authorities; Friday khutba; Islamic law in 
Malaysia 
 
Introduction 
Malaysia is generally recognized as a moderate Muslim state; however, it is currently 
undergoing a gradual Islamization process within the government’s legal and 
administrative systems, which is impacting the lives of all Malaysians. The first wave 
of Islamization occurred in the early 1980s, where the central and state governments 
and religious authorities joined forces in creating a specific ‘mould’ to unify the 
interpretation and practice of Islam in Malaysia. Various initiatives were introduced to 
produce a version of Islam that was in line with the government’s requirements, such 
as registering all public religious schools, standardizing the curriculum for religious 
schools and Islamic subjects, broadcasting religious campaigns via national media, and 
legally preventing any party or person from attempting to propagate and practise Islam 
in ways that were opposed to mainstream Sunni Islam. Despite the numerous studies 
relating to Islamization in Malaysia, none have considered the extent to which the 
Friday khutba is utilized by these two authorities – the government and the religious 
establishment – to convey their approved Islamic interpretations. This will be the focus 
of this article. 
 During 2015, the Friday khutbas issued by the religious authorities received 
considerable criticism, including from people of other faiths. On 9 January 2015, a 
human rights lawyer, Eric Paulsen, publicly stated via his personal Twitter account that 
the Friday khutbas prepared by the Department of Islamic Development of Malaysia 
(Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia; Jakim) had led to a rise in extremism in the 
country. His Twitter post reads: ‘Jakim is promoting extremism every Friday. The 
Government must do something about it if it is serious about eradicating extremism in 
Malaysia’ (quoted by Utusan Online 2015a). Needless to say, Paulsen’s status update 
on social media went viral in no time, enraging and offending a large number of 
Muslims in Malaysia. Responses to his statement came from a broad spectrum of 
Muslims; ministers, politicians from both government and opposition parties, muftis, 
ulamas (Islamic scholars), academics, Muslim bureaucrats and ordinary citizens who 
deemed the Twitter post to be insulting to Islam and seditious in nature. The minister 
in the prime ministerial department responsible for Islamic affairs condemned 
Paulsen’s social media post, claiming that it was ‘…a severely irresponsible act and a 
threat to the religious harmony this nation has enjoyed to date’. Jakim subsequently 
filed a police report on Paulsen’s online status update (Utusan Online 2015b). Paulsen 
was arrested by the police for investigation under the Sedition Act 1948; he was later 
released on bail and is currently awaiting trial. Also in 2015, Chong Eng, a non-Muslim 
Chinese woman and a leader in Malaysia’s democratic political party DAP, criticized 
the content of a Friday khutba that concerned the concept of women’s dress-code 
requirements in Islam, and the tendency of religious authorities to punish Muslim 
women who do not wear the hijab. The police subsequently requested Chong Eng to 
record her statement on the matter (Ali 2015). 
Earlier, in 2013, another criticism of khutbas was made by the Christian 
Federation of Malaysia (CFM). At the time, the issue arising from the use of the word 
‘Allah’ by Christians in Malaysia was at its height. The object of CFM’s censure was 
the content of a khutba prepared by Jakim on 6 September 2013, which CFM claimed 
falsely, and without any real evidence, accused Christian missionaries of actively 
advocating apostasy (Malaysian Insider 2013). At about the same time, during a debate 
in the Malaysian Parliament, a non-Muslim MP questioned the khutba issued by Jakim 
on 30 August 2013, which called Christians enemies of Muslims. However, this was 
subsequently denied by the religious minister (Utusan Online 2013).  
The criticisms voiced by people of other faiths illustrates their concern 
regarding the content of khutbas, which can be easily accessed and heard openly by 
members of the public, including people of other faiths, since the khutba is broadcast 
via television, radio, mosque loudspeakers and online. Remarkably, a large part of the 
Muslim community in Malaysia is averse to openly criticizing khutba contents as they 
believe that the khutba is authoritative and should therefore to be heard and obeyed. To 
date, research on the manipulation of khutbas by government and religious authorities 
for specific motives in various countries has been carried out by several researchers, 
including Borthwick (1967), Wiktorowicz (1999), Kamp (2008), Faier and Torstrick 
(2009), and Errihani (2011). This article will further explore the extent to which 
religious authorities in Malaysia use the khutba to deliver government policies, cement 
Sunni Islam’s position as the religion of the Federation, propagate government-
sanctioned Islamic interpretation and promote the full-fledged implementation of 
hudud law. We discuss briefly the concept of the khutba, and then undertake a more 
detailed examination of khutbas within the context of mosques in Malaysia. This is 
followed by a content analysis of the khutba texts from four perspectives: safeguarding 
the sanctity of Islam; monopolizing the interpretation of Islam; treatment of minority 
Muslim groups; and the implementation of hudud law.  
 
Understanding khutba 
The khutba is a form of public preaching about the teachings of Islam that takes place 
weekly on Friday afternoons, just before the Friday congregational prayers. Muslims 
believe that the khutba is a way for the ulama to communicate to the Muslim 
community, and is rooted in the practices of the Prophet Muhammad within the 
pioneering Muslim community in Medina (Martin 2004). The khutba may also be 
considered as a forum for exchanging and gaining knowledge within the Muslim 
community, in addition to classes for Islamic studies that are held in mosques (Antoun 
1993).  
 Khutbas are delivered by way of reminders, advice and admonishments relating 
to Islamic morality and values (Wardak 2002) and should directly impact and benefit 
the practical aspects of Islamic life (Muzakki 2008). A khutba has two sections, which 
may each last from 15 minutes to an hour, separated by a few minutes to allow the 
khatib (preacher) to sit for a while and the listeners to say prayers. Every khutba 
consists of a basic framework; at its most rudimentary, it should at least contain praises 
to Allah, the reading of one passage from the Qur’an, recitation of the salawat 
(blessings on the Prophet Muhammad) and intercessions for all Muslims in general. 
During the khutba, the congregation should listen in silence, and any kind of talking or 
conversation is prohibited, thus reflecting the level of authority the khutba possesses. 
Azodanloo (1992) critically notes that the image of authority is clearly presented by the 
elevated location of the pulpit above the congregation, who are usually seated on the 
mosque floor. Moreover, if the khatib happens to hold a political office, the khutba he 
delivers will often appear to carry more authority. In addition, the communication is 
one-way, and members of the congregation are unable to interject or pose questions 
about the content of the khutba they are listening to. 
 The ‘audience’ during the khutba is composed entirely of men who live close 
to or happen at the time to be in the neighbourhood of any the mosque in question. It is 
not compulsory for women to attend Friday congregational prayers, so the content of 
khutbas does not usually touch upon women’s issues. Women have never been, and 
never will be, prohibited from attending mosques to listen to the khutba, but they may 
be prevented by the fact that the space allocated to them is small and limited (Kamp 
2008). The congregation does not come from a specific class or denomination and Fathi 
(1981,169) commented that ‘thus anonymity and heterogeneity marked the audience’ 
of the khutba. Despite Muslim communities having diverse interpretations of Islam, 
they are generally willing to set aside their factional allegiances to listen to the universal 
Islamic values expounded in the khutba (Calder 1986). Through the khutba, those 
listening can ‘reinvigorate collective ties through their mutual participation’ 
(Wiktorowicz 2001).  
 Typically, the topics covered by a khutba range from Islamic doctrine, ibadah 
(worship), the life of the Prophet and Islamic ethics. Although the imam selects verses 
from the Qur’an and Hadith that are from a time and context that has clearly passed, 
the focus and purpose of the selection is made with the present in mind. Jones (2012, 
89) writes that the khutba ‘persuades the congregation to act out, project, and apply the 
khutba’s message to its own particular social, cultural, and political reality’. In addition, 
the khutba functions as a platform from which to influence the Muslim community’s 
perception of a certain issue, mobilize activism, strengthen ties and relations amongst 
the congregation (Wiktorowicz 2001) and formulate responses to the challenges faced 
by locals, such as social and religious discrimination (Fink 2007; Hashem 2010).   
 There have undeniably been instances of khutbas broaching topics related to 
social issues and politics, but this does not happen on a weekly basis. Fathi (1981) 
considered that khutbas play an active role in the development of public issues, and 
that they have, in certain situations, been used to criticize established authorities. 
Scholars have different views about when exactly social and political issues started to 
be discussed in Friday prayer khutbas. Errihani (2011) and Wiktorowicz (2001) have 
argued that socio-political topics had long been a theme in khutbas and can be found in 
khutbas from the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Those who hold to this idea are more 
likely to incorporate socio-political aspects in their khutbas and not limit themselves to 
more general topics. However, Borthwick (1967) found that socio-political themes 
were particularly introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, when khutbas in 
the Muslim world began to make use of the pulpit as a platform for political 
legitimization and the discussion of current socio-political issues. Today, in most 
Muslim countries, khutbas have become an effective medium of communication 
between the government, or current political powers, and the Muslim community.      
 What influence do khutbas have on their audience? Considering that the khutba 
is part of worship in Islam, it undoubtedly makes some sort of an impact on the 
worldview of its hearers, who may have been attending khutbas from their childhood. 
Furthermore, with a large turnout almost guaranteed, imams can potentially deliver a 
khutba that has a considerable degree of influence within their communities (Albayrak 
2012). The khutba is an effective medium for conveying and propagating 
interpretations and ideas for the Muslim masses to digest (Muzakki 2008). Moreover, 
those attending must sit in silence for the duration of the khutba, and there is no forum 
in Islam for critical discussion or debate post-khutba. Errihani (2011) argues that, 
through the khutba, Muslims are introduced to a vital aspect of religious discourse: 
there is to be no debate in a public space such as the mosque, especially since the 
content of the khutba is based on the Qur’an and Hadith, which most Muslims believe 
cannot be questioned. Hence the importance of researching the content of khutbas 
delivered around the world.  
 Realistically, the perceived effect of a khutba’s content cannot be the same for 
the whole congregation, given that each individual present has a different level of 
understanding and religiosity. Not every person who prays in a mosque on Friday will 
immediately acquiesce to the ideas the khutba conveys. Despite the compulsory nature 
of the khutba, a small number of people in any congregation will, as Tayob (1999) has 
argued, have somewhat nonchalent ‘responses’ to the khutba, such as falling asleep, 
coming late, and not really focusing on the preaching. In fact, in our own experience, 
it is not unusual to come across a few members of the congregation sleeping or not 
paying attention, which suggests that the khutba may not be as effective for some as it 
is for others.   
 There are currently two approaches to or styles of composing khutbas in most 
mosques. The first is for khutbas to be composed solely and freely by the khatib, and 
the second is for them to be prepared, written, edited and/or approved of by religious 
authorities. Traditionally, the khatib is responsible for the khutba’s content, and must 
take the initiative in selecting the topic to be addressed. He must ensure that the 
khutba’s content is based on Islamic authority and Islamic teachings, and at the same 
time have a sound reason for its selection (Reeber 1991), and he is free to touch upon 
a variety of topics relevant to the congregation. Such khutbas are usually heard in 
mosques in European countries and secular Muslim states such as Indonesia. Khutbas 
are generally structured and composed by the imam or khatib of the mosque in such a 
way as to relate the contents to the Islamic calendar (for example Ramadan), or current 
issues concerning Muslims, or general topics (Kamp 2008). If the khutba is not 
composed by the imam or khatib himself, he may purchase books that contain examples 
of khutbas to be delivered before Friday prayers, as is the practice in Indonesia (Hooker 
2008). This approach to preparing a khutba does not lean towards propagating 
government political ideas. 
 In the second approach, which is quite different, the khutba is written, edited 
and approved by religious authorities in order to achieve certain objectives such as 
religious and political legitimacy (Borthwick 1967), to control the threat of terrorism 
and radical ideologies (Kamp 2008; Errihani 2011), or to filter out Islamic 
interpretations that are not in line with mainstream Muslim beliefs and practices. The 
rationale behind this is that religious authorities have realized the potential for khutbas 
to be ‘vehicle(s) for political announcements and even calls for revolt’ (Faier and 
Torstrick 2009, 29). The application of state bureaucracy to wield control over the voice 
from the pulpit has occurred in many Muslim countries. Countries such as Turkey, 
Egypt, Morocco, Brunei and Malaysia have taken steps to oversee and censor the 
contents of khutbas. Authoritative governments worry about a khutba’s potential effect 
when delivered by a khatib with considerable oratorical skill and powerful religious 
references, which may inspire Muslims to rise up en masse against the state or its 
functions (Wiktorowicz 1999). It is therefore of supreme importance for governments 
to control the contents of khutbas. The khutba is an authoritative form of 
communication by which Islamic authorities address the Muslim community, and can 
have a substantial effect on how Islam is practised and understood. We now consider 
how khutbas are controlled and prepared by religious authorities within the context of 
mosques in Malaysia.  
 
Friday Khutba in the Context of Mosques in Malaysia 
Malaysia is a secular state that has clear constitutional provisions relating to Islam. 
Article 3 of the Constitution states that Islam is the religion of the Federation, that the 
sultan is the religious head of every state that is a monarchy, and that the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong is the religious head in the Federal Territories and states without 
monarchies. This means that all matters pertaining to Islam fall under the purview of 
the sultan of each respective state. This is further detailed in Schedule 9 List II State 
List of the Federal Constitution, which lists matters relating to Islam under the 
jurisdiction of the state government and not the federal government. On the basis of 
this distribution of power, the state assembly enacts legislation relating to Islamic 
administration, the Sharia courts, personal status laws concerned with matters such as 
marriage and inheritance, and laws on matters regarded as minor criminal acts under 
Islamic law. Intervention by the Malaysian federal government on Islamic matters has 
continuously increased since the early 1980s as a result of the Islamization policy 
(Funston 2014). However, the federal government does not have jurisdiction to 
administer matters regarding mosques and Friday khutbas, which are clearly under the 
jurisdiction of the state Islamic authorities.  
 In Malaysia, it is compulsory for all mosques to be registered and governed by 
each state’s Islamic religious council. Given the power bestowed upon the Islamic 
authorities of each state, they are responsible for preparing, publishing and distributing 
khutbas to every certified imam. The khutbas are delivered to mosques by post for 
imams to take further action within a week before the date when the khutba is to be 
delivered. In this way, the issues to be mentioned in the khutba can be updated to reflect 
the latest news. In Malaysia, khutbas are delivered in Malay, except for the parts that 
are recited in the original Arabic and then translated into Malay. This means that the 
whole khutba is comprehensible to almost everyone in attendance since it is delivered 
in the country’s official national language. This situation differs from mosques with 
more diverse communities such as those in Europe, where some khutbas are delivered 
in Arabic and not in the local vernacular, thus limiting how many understand the 
content and significance of the khutba (Wardak 2002).  
 The sultans are the religious heads of their respective states, so all khutbas must 
include recitation of an intercession for the sultan’s well-being, a prominent feature 
unique to khutbas in Malaysia. In fact, the inclusion of an intercession for the sultan at 
the end of the khutba is a practice that has been in place since the medieval period in 
Islam (Jones 2012;). Scholars have traced sources that show that the recitation of 
intercessions for leaders during the khutba is a form of legitimizing and acknowledging 
the authority of the current government (Jones 2012; El Shamsy 2008). In the 
Malaysian context, praying for the sultan signifies that he is the head of Islamic religion 
in his state, and confirms that he has prerogative powers in all matters pertaining to 
Islam there. The failure of a khatib to recite intercessions for the sultan may result in 
his career being brought to an end because refusal to pray for the sultan may be 
interpreted as an act of disavowing the power of the sultan as the head of religion in 
the state concerned. Thus, khutbas in Malaysia are overseen by two authoritative 
powers: the sultan and the more political state or federal governments. Both of these 
authorities may direct or influence officials acting for the religious authorities to write 
khutbas to promote specific agendas and perspectives.  
 State legal provisions and rules provide that only khutbas prepared and 
published by religious authorities are permitted to be read or delivered by an authorized 
and appointed khatib or imam. This means that the khatib cannot read a khutba that he 
himself has written, even if he possesses great credibility in his knowledge and a strong 
background in Islamic studies. It follows that khutbas are not improvised because the 
khatib or imam is bound to use the pre-approved text. State Sharia law calls for stringent 
action against imams who deliver khutbas that are not prepared by the religious 
authorities. For example, Section 97 of the Sharia Criminal Offences Enactment, State 
of Sabah 1995, states: 
Whomsoever reads a khutba on a Friday that was not prepared or approved 
by the Council has committed an offence, and, if convicted, is punishable by 
a fine not exceeding MYR 2000 or imprisonment for no longer than one year 
or both. 
The same provision can be found in section 113A, Sharia Criminal Offences 
Enactment, State of Negeri Sembilan 2004, which also provides that any individual 
who delivers a khutba without permission has committed an offence. In addition, some 
states apply legal provisions that control khutbas implicitly, by allowing only specified 
mosques to hold Friday prayers, so the delivery of the khutbas may be monitored. This 
provision can be found in the states of Terengganu, Perak, Malacca and Pahang, 
although different terminology is used and the sentences imposed upon conviction 
vary. 
 It is important to know the background of the religious officials responsible for 
writing the khutbas. The khutba composers are public officials and civil servants in the 
governmental religious departments and they have some degree of influence over 
society because of their status (Shiozaki and Kushimoto 2014). These religious 
bureaucrats received their early education from state or national religious schools 
(Camilleri 2013) and later furthered their studies in local and foreign universities, so 
they are decidedly different from the pre-Independence, traditionally-trained officials 
who went to pondok (traditional religious boarding school) (Shiozaki and Kushimoto 
2014). After they are appointed to the Friday khutba unit, they are responsible for 
writing khutbas every week or employing university lecturers or certified teachers of 
Islamic studies as external contributors. Each khutba is be evaluated and verified by a 
special committee, whose members are Muslim bureaucrats and local ulama appointed 
by the relevant department. Given the importance of their role, it cannot be denied that 
Muslim bureaucrats have contributed significantly to the successful implementation of 
Islamization policies in Malaysia. Hassan (2007) states that Muslim bureaucrats, 
including those working under the Islamic authorities, have assisted in the 
government’s efforts to initiate the Islamization process and promote Islamic agendas. 
So, why do mosques in Malaysia require the authorities to compose khutbas on 
their behalf? The religious authorities may suggest that the purpose is to help the imams 
and khatibs and lighten their burden. This is because the khutba’s contents must be 
supported by verses from the Qur’an and the Prophetic Hadith, so they must be quoted 
in the right context and meticulously prepared (Kamp 2008). If imams were left without 
khutba texts, they might find difficulty in preparing them. In Malaysia, not all imams 
have the level of education that would enable them to interact with religious texts 
accurately and effectively. The majority have only received a traditional Islamic 
education, which makes them competent in the very basic duties of an imam, such as 
leading the daily congregational prayers, reading and teaching the Qur’an, and making 
funeral arrangements. Albayrak (2012) argues that, before an imam is capable of 
preparing a khutba properly, he first must undergo an extensive training in Islamic 
studies, which will develop his knowledge and religious practices to maturity. Thus, 
the preparation of khutbas by the religious authorities indirectly eases the burden of 
imams in their mosque duties, and this may have been the original intention behind the 
religious authorities’ takeover of the preparation of khutbas every week. However, a 
review of several legal provisions reveals that the motive behind controlling the 
contents of weekly khutbas is based on political legitimacy and the propagation of the 
government’s and religious authorities’ Islamic and political agendas. This becomes 
more apparent in analysis of khutba subtopics.   
 In Malaysia, khutbas are often seen to be an important forum for political parties 
to spread their manifestos.  
There are therefore laws in place to ensure that no criticism may be levelled at the 
central and state government  by any individual during the khutba’s delivery. For 
example, based on Rule 33, Rules of Mosques Officials and Parish Committee (State 
of Selangor) 1999, if any mosque official gives a speech, lecture, Friday khutba or Eid 
al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha khutba that has a tendency to incite hatred, revolt or dislike 
toward the federal government or any state government, or to encourage enmity 
between different ethnicities or amongst citizens in Malaysia, the Islamic religious 
Council may suspend or dismiss that official. This legal provision clearly prevents any 
imam from criticizing the government or airing opinions that go against government 
policies and agendas. Such provisions are not only undemocratic, but also limit the 
capacity of religious communities to interpret Islam in the current and local political 
context. This is supported by Shiozaki and Kushimoto (2014) who argued that, despite 
ulamas in Malaysia being granted good positions in the bureaucratic sector, they are no 
longer free to provide interpretations in Islam. All views and interpretations must be in 
line with the requirements of the central or state governments. 
 There are states such as Selangor that provide a website for people to file 
complaints if a khatib has abused his delivery of the khutba by, for example, sending 
politically motivated messages (Jais 2010a). The same website gives people who 
listened to the khutba an opportunity to evaluate it for qualities such as the khatib’s 
vocal intonation and his fluency in reciting the Qur’an and Hadith (Jais 2010b). 
Unfortunately, these listeners do not have an opportunity to voice their disagreement 
with any part of the khutba’s content in this online form. This complaint mechanism is 
not only potentially subject to misuse, but regrettably, it has resulted in many khatibs 
steering clear of making any changes to the contents of the khutba, even if they disagree 
with it. Ultimately, they read the khutba text without any real choice and for fear of 
legal action if they do not.  
 Most state religious departments have taken proactive steps by uploading all 
khutba texts to their official website to increase the public’s access to weekly khutbas. 
This is one of the many initiatives taken to implement and apply information 
technology in Islamic institutions in Malaysia. States that are slightly ahead 
technologically, such as Selangor and the Federal Territories upload the khutba texts in 
Bahasa Melayu, English, a version written in jawi (Arabic alphabet), and a PowerPoint 
presentation to accompany the text that was read. It is therefore quite possible for those 
who were not present at a particular khutba (especially women) to read and digest its 
contents for themselves. Another reason for the uploads is to keep an online record, 
particularly since Islamic institutions in Malaysia are currently undergoing a major 
administrative transformation, specifically in terms of upgrading their delivery system 
and digital records (Muhammad 2009; Wan Mohd Saman and Haider 2013). Since only 
the text is uploaded to the religious authorities website, the manner and method of its 
actual delivery cannot be replicated and the way it is perceived online is also open to 
discussion. In addition to being accessible online, the official khutba at the National 
Mosque is also televised live every Friday afternoon via the nation’s official 
broadcasting system, RTM and the Islamic government-owned radio station, IKIM.fm. 
Some states also have live radio broadcasts of their Friday khutbas from their state 
mosques. Almost anyone can thus access the contents of a khutba, including 
communities of other faiths that may live close to a mosque and can hear the khutba 
clearly.  
 To sum up: the khutba is a conducive forum for religious authorities and state 
and federal governments to instil their ideas and Islamic interpretations amongst devout 
Muslims. This process is further enabled by Islamic legal provisions and state-level 
Islamic administrative systems. However, in addition to the khutba being a point from 
which knowledge about Islam is communicated to the Muslim masses, there also exists 
in a few khutbas in Malaysia an underlying agenda on the part of government and 
religious authorities, which will be discussed in the findings section below.  
 
Method 
This research is a content analysis research that was conducted descriptively on the 
basis of khutba texts in 2013 and 2014 from six states in Malaysia: The Federal 
Territories, Selangor, Terengganu, Kelantan, Malacca and Sabah. These six states were 
chosen because their religious authorities were among the most consistent in uploading 
khutbas to their website during these two years. Each year, as many as 52 khutba texts 
(104 over two years) were uploaded by the religious authorities for public access and 
use by the mosques.  
The khutbas were selected purposively by reading the titles and texts found on 
the websites. As previously discussed, khutba topics cover myriad issues in Islam, and 
do not all discuss the issues at stake in the present study. The researcher chose khutbas 
that had bearing on the following themes: 1. Safeguarding the sanctity of Islam in 
Malaysia; 2. Monopoly on the interpretation of Islam; 3. Treatment of minority Muslim 
groups; 4. Implementation of hudud law. All of the chosen khutba texts were written 
in Bahasa Melayu and partly in jawi (Arabic alphabet). For the purpose of this article, 
all the quoted texts have been translated so as to retain as much of the original meaning 
of the khutba as possible.  
 
Findings 
Safeguarding the sanctity of Islam 
Islamic authorities in Malaysia often see themselves as the defenders of Islam and as 
playing an important role in preserving its sanctity. As they see it, no individual or 
group may disturb or challenge the sanctity of Islam and its institutions. They therefore 
use the pulpit as a platform from which they respond and react to issues relating to 
Islam in Malaysia. Lee (2010) and Mohamad (2010, 2011) discuss the increase in the 
power and influence of religious bureaucrats and the role of Muslim bureaucrats in 
religious institutions. The effects are already visible in matters such as the development 
of Sharia law in some states, the strengthening of Islamic institutions and the right to 
freedom of religion for people of other faiths. Whenever an issue arises that involves 
other religious communities and Muslims, the religious authorities attempt to dominate 
the situation, including using khutbas as a platform. Khutbas in Malacca stated that the 
religious authorities were responsible for preserving the sanctity of the teachings of 
Islam in Malaysia by referencing several religious sources. One khutba in Malacca 
called for people of other faiths to respect the status of Islam in Malaysia:   
The religion of Islam is venerable, and no other religion is more venerable 
than Islam. We have just recently celebrated our 57th Independence Day. 
Malaysia is an independent country that revolves around the Constitution, and 
the Malaysian Constitution has set Islam as the religion of the Federation. 
Islam is given the highest regard in the country’s Constitution. As such, Islam 
in Malaysia is upheld by all Muslims and respected by people of other faiths. 
Islam has been placed upon a pedestal although other religions may be 
practised on this earth. Therefore, it is the responsibility of Malaysian citizens 
to respect Islam. And I strongly oppose any form of insult to this holy religion 
by people of other faiths. (Khutba dated 31 October 2014; Jaim 2014a) 
 In this khutba, the khatib criticized the actions of Christians in Malaysia who 
fought to use the word ‘Allah’ in their Malay translations of the Bible, which was 
viewed by many as an insult to Islam. A similar sentiment was present in the Federal 
Territories and attracted the interest of the Christian community as stated in the 
introduction:        
…let us together protect the integrity and identity of our religion; our open-
mindedness has enabled matters involving basic Islamic doctrine and 
Tawheed (oneness of God) to be misused by other religions [Christians]. This 
is extremely dangerous because their [Christians] ultimate goal to use the 
word ‘Allah’ is meant to confuse Muslims by claiming that all religions are 
the same. The word ‘Allah’, the daily prayers, Tawheed, the prophets, the 
Kaaba, and hajj are all the rights of Muslims that shall not be trespassed by 
any party. The mimbar (pulpit) also urges the relevant authorities responsible 
to take necessary action against those who would attempt to ruin the beliefs 
and doctrine of Muslims. The battle to defend the sacred word ‘Allah’, to 
uphold the religion accepted by Allah, and to protect the exclusive rights of 
Muslims is a holy battle that is guaranteed to receive Allah’s help and aid. 
(Khutba dated 6 September 2013; Jakim 2013a) 
 Human rights groups in Malaysia also came under the religious authorities’ 
scrutiny after they vocalized their criticism regarding issues of human rights violations 
in the name of religion. The religious authorities countered their criticism via khutbas. 
In Kelantan, one khatib attempted to criticize human rights groups that were lobbying 
for certain Islamic legal provisions relating to apostasy and homosexuality in Malaysia 
to be abolished, as they violated basic human rights. The khutba stressed that: 
 There are specific parties that have planned in the name of protecting basic 
human rights to challenge the principles of freedom allowed under Sharia and 
simultaneously question the status of Islam as the religion of the Federation, 
which is set in the Malaysian Constitution. These people are uncomfortable 
with the implementation of Islamic law in this country. They make various 
demands to be accepted by the government and then furthered to an 
international level. If the Malaysian Government does indeed concede to their 
demands, the implication and effect this will have on Sharia law and the lives 
of Muslims in this country will undoubtedly be a massive one. (Khutba dated 
24 January 2014; Maik 2014a) 
A khutba in Terengganu, on the other hand, touched upon issues relating to the right to 
freedom of religion for apostates and transgender and marital rights for LGBTs, which 
contravene Islamic principles. The khutba saw the criticisms of human rights groups 
and liberal Muslims as an attack against Islam:  
 All these phenomena are part of the enemies of Islam’s subtle and 
meticulously planned agenda to cause deviation in the Muslim umma’s faith 
and trivialize Sharia law. These phenomena must be dealt with swiftly by any 
means possible, in order to prevent them from spreading and inviting Allah’s 
Wrath, as Allah has severely warned us in the Quran. (Khutba dated 28 
November 2014; Maidam 2014a) 
 These khutbas have been used by the religious authorities to place in the minds 
of the Muslim community the idea that Islam is being challenged and threatened by 
other religious communities and human rights groups. Researchers found that in the 
effort to reinforce the status and sanctity of Islam, most khutbas in several states have 
referred to these two parties as the ‘enemies of Islam’. Labelling such as this will 
undoubtedly further cement the idea that the religious authorities are defending and 
protecting Islam from the ‘enemies of Islam’. It would also appear that the religious 
authorities are attempting to sow seeds of fear in the listeners so that they agree with 
the opinions and actions to be taken in defending Islam.   
 
Monopoly on the interpretation of Islam 
The governments of several Muslim countries are facing competition from Islamic 
movements or Islamists to win the battle for hegemony over religious interpretation 
and sacred authorities. Wiktorowicz’s (1999) work in Jordan shows that the 
government there introduced a series of measures and strategies to control the 
interpretation of Islam. A similar situation has occurred in Malaysia, where only Sunni 
Islam has been accepted as the definition of Islam in the Constitution and Islamic 
statutory law. The central and state governments use religious authorities to monopolise 
the power to interpret text in Islam by declaring any other interpretations to be deviant 
and misleading (Hamid 2003). Furthermore, religious authorities at state level use 
whatever instruments of power they have to diminish Islamic heterogeneity internally, 
as observed by Hoffstaedter (2013). Clearly, the khutba is an effective channel for this 
purpose. It may affect a large number of the more conservative and devout Muslims in 
Malaysia who depend so strongly on the credibility of religious authorities as 
interpreters of Islamic text.  
 Khutbas in several states that were researched would consistently explain that 
the mainstream practice of Islam in Malaysia is the true and authentic path of Islam. In 
discussing the nature of interpretations of Islam that are acceptable in the state of 
Malacca, a khutba stated:  
Groups that affiliate themselves with Islam such as Shia, Rafida, Khawarij, 
Murji’a, Qadaria, Jahmiyya, and so on have contravened some or all of the 
basic principles in Islam. Teachings that reject the Qur’an and the Sunna, 
interpret Islam on a purely intellectual level or based on convenience and 
desire, and vilify the Companions, are extreme in nature and must be 
opposed; they do not fall within the teachings of the Sunni Islam. (Khutba 
dated 17 October 2014; Jaim 2014b) 
 There were also khutbas that gave justifications for why tolerance towards other 
Islamic schools was not an option. This excerpt from a khutba in Malacca seems to 
suggest that if diversity in Islam were allowed in Malaysia, there would be no guarantee 
of social unity:  
The stance taken by the authorities and Islamic institutions in designating the 
Sunni school of Islam as the official way of Islam is to use it as a guide, way 
of life and practice for Muslims in this country. It is clear that this stance has 
left a lasting impact by uniting the umma and strengthening the unity and 
stability enjoyed by the nation. Therefore, any efforts to insert teachings and 
beliefs other than Sunni Islam or practices that are atypical to the normal 
practices of the Muslim community may be seen as an effort to divide society 
and disturb the peace and harmony of the country. (Khutba dated 17 October 
2014; Jaim 2014c) 
 The congregation was also reminded that the power to interpret religious 
principles was the sole prerogative of the ulama. This means that the general public 
must follow whatever definition of Islam is voiced by the religious authorities without 
opposition or criticism. One khatib in Selangor advised:  
Members of the public who are not religious experts are prohibited from ever 
providing false information relating to religion, because speaking without 
knowledge is akin to speaking untruths and can have a dangerous misleading 
effect on one’s faith. There is no need for feigned heroism in a field that you 
do not command or possess. The fact is everyone has a chance to be a 
religious expert, but one must first have a firm grasp of the discipline of 
Islamic knowledge in this field, and not just parrot what and what not to obey; 
do not become carbon copies or copy and paste the sayings of enemies of 
Islam or those who do not aspire to religion. (Khutba dated 19 December 
2014; Jais 2014a) 
Khutbas have also been used by religious authorities to communicate the duty 
of Muslims in Malaysia to take action against heresy, which includes deviant teachings 
or beliefs. First, Muslims must steer clear of any interpretations that are not aligned 
with the opinions of religious authorities such as the National Fatwa Council. For 
example, one khutba in Terengganu clearly defended the ulamas’ authority by 
countering criticism by anti-Hadith groups in Malaysia that equated ulamas to priests. 
The khutba quoted Q 20.28, which declares the ulama to be Allah’s most pious of slaves 
(Khutba dated 4 April 2014; Maidam 2014b). In a similar vein, khutbas in Selangor 
and Terengganu reminded the audience: 
Therefore, the hidden reality behind the teachings that oppose the Hadith of 
Rasulullah is that there is opposition to the implementation of Islam and 
upholding the Sharia in their lives. Therefore, Muslims must take a stand and 
reject any and all heretical beliefs and teachings in order to preserve the 
sanctity and authenticity of the sources of Islam. We must also prevent these 
deviant ideas and teachings from spreading amongst our families, friends and 
acquaintances … Muslims must never ever be influenced by supporting, 
helping or spreading the word of anti-Hadith groups as this will lead to 
apostasy. (Khutba dated 25 April 2014; Jais 2014b) 
 
It must be stressed that heretics will not stop from propagating their deviation. 
Therefore, Muslims must keep far away from them and their ideologies to 
protect the purity of Islamic doctrine from being corrupted by these deviants, 
since everything they deny and question is set in the Quran. (Khutba dated 4 
April 2014; Jheat 2014) 
 
 Muslims must lodge a complaint to the religious authorities if they come across 
any activities or teachings that contradict Sunni Islam beliefs and principles. During 
the year-end khutba of 2014, the khatib reminded the Muslim community of Selangor 
to remove themselves from heresy or any interpretations that deviated from the 
principles of the religious authorities. The khutba listed all the teachings that were 
declared to be deviant in Selangor and the nature of those teachings so that the listeners 
could stay clear of them (Jais 2014a). Similarly, a khutba in Sabah called upon the 
Muslim community there to be more proactive in assisting the authorities to curb the 
influence of heretic teachings against Sunni principles:  
In case there are groups or individuals who attempt to propagate teachings, 
practices and beliefs that contradict Sunni Islam and the Sharia, Muslims in 
this state must lodge complaints with the religious authorities in their area. 
This action is to ensure that these deviant teachings, practices and beliefs do 
not expand and spread amongst society. (Khutba dated 17 October 2014; 
Jheains 2014) 
 
On a similar note, a khutba in Malacca stated:  
Any teachings, ideas, principles or beliefs that contradict or deviate from 
Sunni Islam must be prevented and stayed away from as stated in the fatwa 
by the Religious Council or Mufti’s Department in states across Malaysia. 
All new teachings and ideologies that cause confusion must be referred 
directly to the National Fatwa Council, the State Mufti’s Department and 
certified ulamas as well as Islamic institutions recognized by the authorities. 
(Khutba dated 17 October 2014; Jaim 2014c) 
 
 Khutbas have been used by the religious authorities to urge the government to 
wield their political power to control the propagation of teachings other than that of 
Sunni Islam. For example, in criticizing anti-Hadith groups in Malaysia, a khutba in 
the Federal Territories stated:  
The mimbar also recommends that the relevant party takes the necessary steps 
to ensure that Muslims are not influenced by ideologies that may ruin their 
faith and worldview. Do not let this matter slide or trivialize it, because even 
a virus, if left unattended, will spread and cause destruction beyond 
expectations one’s initial expectations. (Khutba dated 21 February 2014; 
Jakim 2014) 
 
Treatment of minority Muslim groups 
Khutbas have also been a platform used by Islamic authorities to reject the concept of 
religious pluralism and to explain the ‘offence’ of being a non-Sunni Muslim. The 
ulama and other religious authorities often claim that religious pluralism and diverse 
interpretation of Islam are un-Islamic and must be proscribed (Lai 2014; New Straits 
Times 2014). Malaysia has until now been recognized as a heterogeneous Muslim state 
where religious and non-religious communities are divided only by doctrine and culture 
(Aziz and Shamsul 2006). In 2013 and 2014, the main focus of the Islamic authorities 
has been the minority group of Shi’a Muslims. Khutbas have been employed to explain 
the difference between Sunnis and Shi’ites in doctrine and Sharia law. At the end of 
the khutba, the congregation is counselled not to follow or study the teachings of the 
Shi’a or risk having legal action taken against them. 
 A khutba in Terengganu attempted to justify why swift and severe action should 
be taken to stop the spread of Shi’ism there: 
This conflict [between Sunnis and Shi’ites] may cause fighting parties to 
easily shed the blood of their opponents. If this conflict is successfully planted 
within our nation’s Muslim society, the enemies of Islam who have long 
awaited the downfall of our people and country will most certainly rejoice. 
Death and the destruction of property as a result of such conflict is not an 
assumption, but reality; and the reality is that it will happen again in a nation 
that has followers from these conflicting schools … If this were to happen in 
our country, our mosques may one day be divided into Sunni mosques and 
Shi’a mosques. And at that time, we will no longer be able to appreciate our 
opponents. Therefore, stay away from the Shi’a and its dangerous teachings, 
before we are beset with the woes of battle, murder and civil war. (Khutba 
dated 27 September 2013; Maidam 2013) 
A khutba in Selangor focused in detail on the ‘offence’ of Shi’a teachings from 
a Sunni perspective and informed the congregation of the fatwa pronouncing the 
deviance of the Shi’a. According to the fatwa, any Shi’a followers may face charges in 
the Sharia court for violation of a fatwa. The khutba reminded the congregation: 
Based on part of the deviant Shi’a teachings explained by the khatib today, it 
is clear to see that the beliefs, practices and principles of these Shi’ites are 
very much in contradiction with Sunnism. The conflict arises not just from a 
practical point of view, but in fact from the very roots of the creed itself. 
Therefore, it is obligatory to prevent ourselves from falling within their reach 
so that we may not follow in their deviance and practice that which is not 
from the true Sharia. (Khutba dated 20 June 2014; Jais 2014c) 
In the Federal Territory, one khutba urged the listeners to assist the authorities in 
constraining the expansion of the Shi’a by lodging reports:  
As Muslims, it is our duty to report to the religious authorities in our 
respective areas if we suspect, come to know of or actually witness any party 
attempting to spread the deviant teachings of the Shi’a. Remember, any and 
all efforts to contain such teachings fall within the meaning of ‘jihad’ in 
defending the integrity of the religion that was passed down to us, whereas 
any attempts to stir up chaos by spreading the teachings of the Shi’a are 
counted as acts that are deviant and misleading. (Khutba dated 29 November 
2013; Jakim 2013b) 
In Kelantan, one khutba ordered that Shi’a followers should repent and called their 
beliefs ‘acts of stupidity’ that must be rejected. The khatib stated:  
Whoever amongst the Muslim accepts the teachings of the Shi’a and takes 
part in insulting and vilifying the Companions must repent swiftly and ask for 
Allah’s forgiveness, and turn away from those acts of stupidity and return to 
Sunni Islam. (Khutba dated 29 March 2013; Maik 2013)    
 The Shi’a community in Malaysia is currently facing social pressure and legal 
action is being taken against individuals who practise Shi’a teachings, study their 
doctrines and propagate it to the public (Musa 2013). The contents of khutbas such as 
this one may potentially increase the mistreatment and religious persecution of these 
communities.  
  
Implementation of hudud law 
Khutbas are a useful forum for extending knowledge about the Sharia to the Muslim 
community (Feener 2012), or as Hooker (2008) puts it, ‘the khutba is a public 
exposition of Sharia each week’. According to the latter’s research in Indonesia, 
khutbas are generally laden with Sharia perspectives on a variety of issues or incidents 
that occur in that country. However, his research did not find any evidence of issues in 
Islamic criminal law such as hudud being discussed in the khutba books in Indonesia. 
It is possible that no major issues on the matter of hudud implementation arise in 
Indonesia as they do in Malaysia. 
 In Malaysia, the polemic on hudud was first discussed when the government of 
the state of Kelantan led at the time by the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) had prepared 
legislative framework relating to hudud and qisas, called the Enakmen Kanun Jenayah 
Syariah (II) 1993. However, the laws could not be implemented because they were 
believed to contravene the provisions of the Federal Constitution and other relevant 
acts that had limited the power of the Sharia court in sentencing for criminal offences 
(Seda-Poulin 1993; Harding 2002). Since the effort to introduce Sharia criminal law in 
full has yet to succeed, the campaign for it is currently ongoing, and the most effective 
stage from which to campaign is via khutba. 
 Most scholars have identified the main players in this campaign as Islamists 
within certain political parties. However, Hamayotsu (2012, 407) criticizes the 
stereotypical view, arguing: ‘It is important to note that demands to expand the 
institutions of Sharia come not only from Islamist opposition, but also from Muslim 
elites within the ruling party and state apparatus.’ These include religious authorities in 
most states, who play a leading role in raising awareness amongst Muslim communities 
in Malaysia about the necessity of implementing the hudud laws. Through the khutbas 
that they prepare, the religious authorities show a positive attitude towards the 
implementation of hudud.. The question is, why does hudud law need to be 
implemented in Malaysia? The religious authorities attempt to rationalize the 
implementation of these controversial laws for the listeners to process:   
The methods of caning, amputation of hands and the death sentence carried 
out in public will make the criminals facing these sentences truly believe that 
they are being punished by the people. Herein lies the factor of the 
effectiveness of hudud, which leaves such an effect on the public that it 
automatically promotes prevention, and every person who harbours intentions 
to commit similar crimes will be forced to think long and hard about the 
consequences if they are caught. Society needs to be made aware of the fact 
that the nature of hudud is to deter and educate. (Khutba dated 6 June 2014; 
Maik 2014b) 
 
The implementation of Islamic law, including hudud sentencing, qisas and 
takzir is a responsibility and obligation; the governing powers must try as hard 
as possible to ensure that Allah’s Divine laws may be implemented. We shall 
all be questioned and held responsible by Allah in the afterlife according to 
our respective roles and capacity while on this earth. Will we be categorized 
as those who went against Sharia or will we be categorized as those who tried 
and searched for ways to implement Islamic law? All parties must unite to 
make this noble intention a success. (Khutba dated 30 May 2014; Maik 
2014c) 
 
There is no shortcut to resolving this matter [social issues] unless we practise 
Islam in its entirety and absolutely, be it Islamic creed, Sharia law or Islamic 
transaction. (Khutba dated 11 April 2014; Maik 2014d) 
 
As for the sentences of stoning, amputation of the hands and death, all 
seemingly horrific, and they are indeed horrific; but would it not therefore 
cause future would-be offenders to think a thousand times before committing 
whatever crimes are out there? This is the deterrence effect that is born from 
the different stages of punishment. (Khutba dated 5 September 2014; Jais 
2014d)  
Through the khutba, the religious authorities can provide clarification based on 
a classical Islamic perspective to shape the Muslim community’s understanding of 
hudud, as well as to respond to certain parties’ criticisms regarding these laws. The 
religious authorities have tried to silence many viewpoints on the subject of hudud 
implementation by warning that rejection of hudud is akin to apostasy and that one will 
be punished by Allah for it. Such a warning from the authorities will undoubtedly create 
a sense of unease amongst Muslims and thus cause them to continue their undivided 
support of hudud.   
Hoping or believing that laws more suitable than Allah’s divine laws is wrong 
and can ruin one’s faith. The Qur’an and Hadith comprise what is meant by 
Allah’s law. Allah’s law encompasses what Allah has determined for us and 
how to do it, whether it is a question of worship, business, crime or marriage. 
Debating and doubting the effectiveness and benefit of Allah’s law by 
claiming that there are laws better than His will render that person an apostate 
and out of Islam. (Khutba dated 31 January 2014; Jaim 2014b) 
 
Muslims must prevent themselves from this habit of questioning Allah’s laws 
without knowing the real situation of things in order to avoid the ruination of 
their faith and receiving the commensurate punishment in the afterlife. 
(Khutba dated 5 September 2014; Jais 2014d) 
As congregations are only presented with the classical views of the ulama, 
Muslims may have limited understandings of hudud. This is supported by Moustafa 
(2013, 2014), who found that the Muslim community in Malaysia had an erroneous 
understanding and perception of Sharia and Islamic law, including hudud and the 
current Islamic legal system in Malaysia. 
 
Discussion 
The khutbas quoted in this research demonstrate that the religious authorities in 
Malaysia have discussed topics that may potentially lead listeners to narrow and 
undiversified religious interpretation by rejecting interpretations and views that do not 
match their own, claiming that only their interpretations count as true Islam, promoting 
religious sanction and persecution of Muslim minority groups such as the Shi’a and 
snubbing the idea of religious pluralism. Furthermore, they also use a negative tone in 
discussing the right to freedom of religion and apostasy, LGBT rights and Muslim 
transgenders, and other human rights issues. It must be stressed here that problematic 
khutbas such as these are not delivered every week. However, the religious authorities 
take advantage of whatever space they can to convey their ideas and interpretations and 
build their image and reputation as defenders of Islam.   
In addition, government policies relating to Islam can also be propagated efficiently 
via khutbas, causing the Muslim community to cease questioning them because they 
have been neatly packaged in religious doctrine. The khutbas that were analysed show 
evidence of several federal and state government policies on Islam that were discussed 
in these khutbas, such as the position of Islam as the religion of the Federation and the 
execution of Islamic law. Khutbas have provided serious arguments as to why the 
Muslim community should support the effort to implement Islamic law completely, 
including hudud law. For a long time, Islamists in Malaysia were quite alone in their 
effort to promote the implementation of hudud laws; however, in recent years, the 
nation has witnessed religious institutions moving their campaigns in that direction, 
thus shaping the community’s attitude towards the need for the implementation of these 
laws.  
One cause of concern is that there are no external bodies that monitor, evaluate 
or improve the content of the khutbas. There is no post-khutba forum for Muslims to 
question, discuss or voice dissent with a khutba’s contents. When listening to a khutba 
in a government-controlled mosque, one must listen with obedience rather than 
understanding or pleasure (Errihani 2011). In Malaysia, there is no room for the 
congregation to discuss the khutba, to correct its contents or to debate it in any form. 
This emphasizes the idea that everything that is spoken in a khutba is correct and must 
be adhered to by every Muslim. The act of criticizing or questioning the contents of a 
khutba is seen as a form of insult to the sultan. This premise was crafted by a mufti, 
who stated via the media that the ‘duty to prepare the Friday khutba by Jakim or the 
Islamic Religious Department is one that is bestowed and approved by the Sultan 
(states) and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (for the Federal Territories), therefore all 
parties should respect it’ (Astro Awani 2013). Although this statement was made by 
only one mufti out of 14, it nonetheless gives the impression that serious religious 
authorities wish to silence any talk of a khutba’s contents. The Malay Muslim 
community, which is particularly fond of the monarchical institutions in Malaysia and 
acknowledges the sultan as the head of religion in their state, will thus find it hard to 
accept that khutbas can be criticized. 
Clearly, some khatibs in Malaysia do not have a choice in delivering the 
khutbas, which impacts their freedom as religious scholars. Reeber (1991, 292) states 
‘If the khatib no longer has freedom of movement, other platforms will arise, away 
from the liturgical category of the mosque, where it proves possible to produce once 
more the instruction and doctrine of one’s choice in complete freedom.’ The question 
is, are imams in Malaysia looking for another platform from which to be heard since 
they cannot write their own khutbas? It is difficult to prove the existence of other 
platforms, as mentioned by Reeber, since the imams in Malaysian mosques are 
appointed by the Islamic authorities after their qualifications, political leanings and 
school of thought have been evaluated. It is certain that only those with visions in line 
with the Islamic authorities can be selected as imams and allowed to read the khutba. 
The downside to this is that they will most probably never question any of the contents 
prepared for them.  
 
Conclusion 
This article discusses khutbas in Malaysia that were initially controlled and prepared 
by the religious authorities to facilitate administration, reduce the burden on imams and 
convey certain government policies. However, this research has found that khutbas 
have become a platform for the religious authorities to present their worldview, which 
is in contradiction with Islam’s nature as a religion that is broad, acknowledges 
diversity and encourages tolerance. The khutbas that were analysed have shown that 
ideas that may promote narrow religious interpretations and religious intolerance of 
Muslim minorities have been presented, albeit not every week, in thousands of mosques 
across Malaysia. At the same time, the religious authorities are serious in conducting 
their campaign for the implementation of hudud law, and are attempting to be champion 
defenders of Islam in relation to a variety of social, religious and political issues in this 
multi-ethnic society. However, listeners in the congregations come from a variety of 
backgrounds, such that some may be critical of what they hear, while others may simply 
accept it all as part of the teachings of Islam. This itself will most certainly cause some 
unease to the religious authorities in Malaysia, who have long assumed that they are 
the spokespeople for Islam.   
 The time has come for Muslims in Malaysia to contribute to the composition of 
khutbas without being controlled and monitored by the religious authorities. By 
allowing this kind of flexibility, Muslims may contribute intellectually in the relevant 
Islamic forums in Malaysia and give a balanced perspective or counter-narrative on 
what the religious authorities propagate. In addition, the religious authorities need to 
provide a suitable forum for Muslims to discuss the contents of Friday khutbas, give 
feedback, correct mistakes and inaccuracies, challenge views, and even provide a 
different interpretation. Most importantly, the contents of khutbas should be allowed to 
be criticized and debated. This case study can be a used as a guide and reference by 
any and all Muslim communities beyond Malaysia to prevent governments and 
religious authorities from controlling Friday khutbas and thus avoid the risk of their 
being manipulated to serve special interests.  
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